Wi-Fi Roaming Variations Cheatsheet v1

Information in this sheet has been taken from Andrew Von Nagy's article: <u>Wi-Fi Roaming Analysis part 2 - Roaming</u> <u>Variations (bit.ly/AVN_Roam)</u>

Simple Authentication & Roam: Non-802.1X methods, lower security, roam time < 50mS</p>

➤ Full 802.1X Authentication & Roam: Full 802.1X auth, RADIUS server req, typically > 600mS roam time

➡ Fast Roaming: Initial 802.1X auth, followed by fast roam method to ensure <100mS roam req by voice traffic</p>

Simple Authentication & Roam

Open Network

- Typically used on guest hotspot solutions
- ➤ User traffic un-encrypted at layer 2
- ➤ Authentication generally via captive portal

➤ Data flow after 802.11 open auth & 802.11 assoc frames exchange

Static WEP

➤ Layer 2 encryption, but easily cracked

➤ Data flow after 802.11 open auth & 802.11 assoc frames exch (plus WEP encryption)

➤ "Data protection" bit in 802.11 header indicate WEP encryption used

Static WEP Shared Key Authentication

➤ Variation of Static WEP, but less secure

➤ AP & client perform additional exchange to verify correct key held by client

➤ Desire to use key auth signalled in auth req & resp frames (auth algorithm field)

WPA/WPA2 Pre-shared Key

- Client & AP configured with shared PSK
- \succ 802.11 open auth & assoc exch before 4 way handshake for exch of nonces
- ➤ Passphrase, STA addr, 4W h/shake nonces & SSID used to produce keying material
- Scalability issues as all users have same passphrase (revocation?)
- Knowledge of PSK & observation of 4W handshake allows data decryption
- ➤ Also known WPA2-Personal, use in SOHO market only

Full 802.1X Authentication & Roam

Dynamic WEP

- >> Vendor proprietary method (Cisco)
- ➤ Combines use of WEP & 802.11X/EAP (mainly Cisco's LEAP)
- ➤ Unicast & broadcast keys assigned via 2 EAPoL key frames after EAP auth, providing dynamic unicast keys (no longer static WEP keys)
- ➤ Still flawed as uses WEP
- ➤ Dynamic WEP not signalled in 802.11 frames, static config on client & AP

WPA/WPA2 Full Authentication

- ➤ User credentials verified via AAA auth server
- ➡ EAP auth performed after 802.11 auth & assoc frame exchange
- ➡ EAP protocol may require many frame exchanges for auth, creating roaming delay
- ➤ For each client roam, EAP auth required before data flow (data path broken in each roam)
- ➤ AAA server & client derive unique session master key (sent to AP/WLC by AAA server)
- ➤ AP & client perform 4 way handshake to generate temporal key from master key for data encryption
- ➤ Auth delay when roaming causes issues for voice & video traffic
- ➤ WPA & WPA2 created by Wi-Fi Alliance
- ➤ Popular EAP methods: EAP-TLS, PEAP

Fast Roaming

<u>CCKM</u>

- Cisco proprietary fast roam method
- Supported on autonomous & lightweight APs
- ➡ When roaming, client increments re-key # and derives new PTK key using AP BSSID
- ➡ Client indicates CCKM support via proprietary IE (requires CCX support on client)
- ➡ AP Support indicated by vendor AKMP in beacons & probe responses
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- Soam time usually < 50mS</p>
- Supports TKIP, AES, LEAP, PEAP, EAP-TLS

WPA/WPA2 EAP Session Resumption

- Also called "Fast Reconnect"
- ➡ Following full 802.1X auth, TLS session & security context cached on client & server
- ➡ Presence of cached TLS session implies successful previous auth, inner client auth may be skipped when roaming
- ➡ Typically 50% reduction in frame exchange on roam & re-auth
- r⇒ Typically < 300mS roam time (network architecture dependant)</p>
- Shot fast enough for real time apps (e.g.voice)

 $\ensuremath{\stackrel{\scriptstyle \leftarrow}{\scriptstyle}}$ Proprietary method requires support on auth server & client

WPA2 PMK Caching

Also known as Static PMK caching & Fast/Secure Roam-back, part of 802.11i

- IN Client re-uses PMKSA from previous 802.1X auth
- S 4W handshake only (if AP has cached PMKID)
- Roam time typically < 100mS
- Solution Solution Constrained and Solution S

WPA2 Proactive Key Caching (PKC/OKC)

- Also known as OKC, proprietary method
- ➡ Extends WPA2 PMK by allowing re-use of single cached PMKSA across group of APs (e.g. on same WLC)
- Con roam, client calcs PMKID based on new AP BSSID
- Allows EAP auth to be skipped, 4W handshake only req
- Soam time < 100mS</p>

WPA2 Fast BSS Transition

- Standardized, secure fast transition support 802.11r
- Support advertised by MDIE in beacons, probe resp & (re)assoc responses by AP
- Client indicates support in auth & (re)assoc frames
- ➡ After initial full 802.1X auth, keys distributed to other APs
- ⇒ 802.1X & 4W handshake skipped on roam, < 50mS roam
- Solution ⇒ Over the air & over DS methods supported

Useful Links:

- <u>Wi-Fi Roaming Analysis part 2 Roaming Variations</u> (<u>http://bit.ly/AVN_Roam</u>)
- <u>Robust Security Network (RSN) Fast BSS Transition</u> (FT) - (http://bit.ly/CWNP_FT_PDE)
- <u>Standardized Fast Secure Roaming whitepaper</u> -(http://bit.ly/AVN_FTWP)

(V 1.3 May 2018) Latest version of this sheet: <u>www.wifinigel.com</u> Feedback: <u>wifinigel@gmail.com</u>